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MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN FREEDOM: 
SOME CLARIFICATIONS 
David Basinger 
The concept of middle knowledge-God's knowledge of what would in fact happen in 
every conceivable situation-is just beginning to receive the attention it deserves, For 
example, it is just now becoming clear to many that classical theism requires the affirmation 
of middle knowledge. But this concept is also coming under increasing criticism. The 
most significant of these, I believe, has been developed in a recent discussion by William 
Hasker, in which he argues that the concept of a true counterfactual of freedom is 
incoherent. I also believe, however, that his critique ultimately fails and specify why in 
the essay which follows. 
To say that God is omniscient, most theistic philosophers and theologians agree, 
is to say that God knows all true propositions and none that are false-i.e., God 
knows all that is knowable. But exactly what is knowable? Most agree that those 
propositions describing what is (or has been) actual and that which will with 
certainty follow from what is actual are true and thus known by God to be true. 
And, traditionally, most have also held that God has simple foreknowledge. That 
is, they have believed that those propositions describing what will actually occur, 
including what humans will freely choose to do, are true now and thus are also 
known to be so by God. 
But what of counterfactual knowledge? What, for example, should be said 
about the following statement: "If Ted Kennedy had won the Presidential election 
in 1980, he would have run again in 1984." The antecedent is false, so the 
statement cannot be true (and thus knowable) by virtue of the fact that it describes 
what has occurred or will actually occur. But is it not either true or false that if 
Kennedy had won in 1980, he would have run again? And, thus, ought we not 
maintain that God knows that truth or falsity of such hypothetical conditionals? 
There are some respected philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga who claim 
that God does indeed have such 'middle knowledge'. But recently a number of 
other philosophers have been challenging this contention. One of the most sig-
nificant of these challenges has come from William Hasker. J In fact, I believe 
Hasker offers the strongest challenge to middle knowledge to date. I shall argue, 
however, that his critique ultimately fails. 
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I 
Hasker focuses his discussion on counterfactuals of freedom such as the follow-
ing: 
(1) If Elizabeth were offered a grant, she would accept it. 
(2) If Elizabeth were offered a grant, she would reject it. 
Most critics of middle knowledge, he points out, attack the assumption that, for 
any pair of counterfactuals such as (1) and (2), one is true and the other false. 
They argue either that both are false or that neither has at present any truth value. 
But Hasker doesn't believe such critics have been successful so he adopts a 
different strategy. He invites us to assume for the sake of discussion that some 
countelfactuals of freedom are true and then raises the following question: Who 
or what (if anything) brings it about that these propositions are true? 
It cannot be God, he argues. For if God is the one who makes it the case that 
agents would respond in certain ways under certain circumstances, then it is 
hard to avoid the conclusion that in such circumstances such agents would not 
be free. Nor, Hasker believes, can it be the agent who makes these propositions 
true. Some proponents of MK, he acknowledges, do believe that it is the agent 
who brings about the truth of counterfactuals in those possible worlds in which 
the antecedent is true. However, once we properly understand what it means for 
one proposition to be "true independently of " the truth of another proposition 
and apply this analysis to the case at hand, he argues, we see that the truth of 
all counterfactuals in all possible worlds is independent ofthe action of the agent. 
But, if the truth of all counterfactuals of freedom is independent of the action 
of the agent, Hasker continues, then what do the agents in such counterfactuals 
really have it in their power to d<r-e.g., what does Elizabeth really have it in 
her power to do when the grant is offered? To make this detennination, we are 
told, we must consider two 'power entailment' principles, principles which 
Hasker believes to be quite obviously correct: 
(3) If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q" and 
"Q" is false, then it is in A's power to bring it about that Q. 
(4) If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q," then 
either it is in A's power to bring it about that Q, or the truth of "Q" 
is a necessary condition of A's having the power to bring it about that P. 
But (3) and (4), he believes, spell doom for the concept of a true counterfactual 
of freedom. Utilizing Elizabeth's case again, his basic line of reasoning runs as 
follows. If we assume that Elizabeth will accept the grant if it is offered and 
then ask whether it is in her power to reject the offer, then in tenns of (3) and 
(4), "A," "P" and "Q" become the following: 
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A = Elizabeth 
P = Elizabeth rejects the grant. 
Q = If Elizabeth is offered the grant, she will reject it. 
But when we plug these values into (3) and (4), we quickly see that Elizabeth 
does not have it in her power to reject the offer. For given (3), if it is in A's 
(Elizabeth's) power to bring it about that P (to reject the offer) and "Q" is false 
(if she will in fact accept the grant offered), then it must be in A's power to 
bring it about that Q. And it has already been shown that no agent has it in her 
power to bring it about that any counterfactual of freedom is true. Thus, given 
(4), it can only be in A's (Elizabeth's) power to bring it about that P (to reject 
the offer) if the truth of "Q" is a necessary condition of A's (Elizabeth's) having 
the power to bring it about that P (to reject the offer). But "Q" is in fact false 
in this case. So we must conclude that it is not in Elizabeth's power to reject 
the grant. And if it is not in her power to reject the grant, if offered, then she 
cannot be said to be free with respect to the offer in question. 
From this it follows, Hasker then concludes, that "the concession made ear-
lier--that some counterfactuals of freedom are true-was unwarranted .... Insofar 
as such counterfactuals are true, they are not counterfactuals of freedom .... And 
on the other hand insofar as the agent is genuinely free there are no true coun-
terfactuals stating what that agent would definitely do under various possible 
circumstances. And so the doctrine of middle knowledge is seen to be untenable: 
There are no true counteifactuals of freedom. "2 
II 
I applaud Hasker's approach. I believe that attempts to demonstrate that all 
counterfactuals of freedom are either false or have no truth value will never be 
totally convincing. Thus, it seems to me that only those like Hasker who attempt 
to demonstrate that such counterfactuals are incoherent pose a real threat to 
middle knowledge. 
Moreover, I agree that if counterfactuals of freedom are true, this is not so 
because of anything God or human agents have done. And finally, I agree that 
if we accept (3) and (4) in their present state, then it is the case that there are 
no true counterfactuals of freedom. 
But ought we accept (3) and (4)? Are these power entailment principles such 
that "a little thought will show [them] to be correct?,,3 At one level they are 
perfectly acceptable. Consider, for instance, the two test cases offered by Hasker: 
A = You A= I 
P ,= You see the sunrise. P = Iring your doorbell. 
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Q = The sun is in fact now rising. Q = You now have a doorbell. 
It certainly seems correct to say, given (3), that if it is in my power to ring your 
doorbell, and ringing your doorbell entails that you now have a doorbell and it 
is false that you now have a doorbell, then it must be in my power to bring it 
about that you now have a doorbell. And it certainly seems correct to say, given 
(4), that if you have it in your power to see the sunrise, and your seeing a sunrise 
entails that the sun is rising, then it is either in your power to bring it about that 
the sun is rising or the fact that the sun is now rising is a necessary condition 
of your having the power to see the sun. 
Moreover, there is a sense in which the proponent of middle knowledge will 
have no problem with (3) and (4). Let us again consider (1) and (2). Given, (3) 
and (4), (1) and (2) become the following: 
A = Elizabeth 
P = Elizabeth accepts the grant. 
Q = The grant is offered. 
A = Elizabeth 
P = Elizabeth rejects the grant. 
Q = The grant is offered. 
And the proponent of middle knowledge will certainly not deny that if Elizabeth 
has it in her power to bring it about that she accepts or rejects the grant, then 
either she can bring it about that the grant is offered or the offering of the grant 
is a necessary condition for her having the power to bring it about that the grant 
is accepted or rejected. 
The problem for middle knowledge arises when "Q" becomes the counterfactual 
of freedom itself. But when considered in this context, it is no longer so obvious 
that (3) and (4) are acceptable. Let us consider Hasker's doorbell example in 
this light. If we assume that I will ring the doorbell if the opportunity presents 
itself and then ask whether it is in my power to refrain from ringing the doorbell, 
then in terms of (3) and (4), "A," "P" and "Q" become the following: 
A = I 
P = I refrain from ringing the doorbell. 
Q = If presented with the opportunity to ring the doorbell, I will refrain 
from doing so. 
Now, if we accept (3), then, given that "Q" is false, it is in my power to refrain 
from ringing the doorbell only if it is in my power to bring it about that "Q" is 
true. But I have already granted that agents cannot bring about the tntth of 
counterfactuals of freedom. Thus, ifwe accept (4), it can only be in my power 
to refrain from ringing the doorbell if the truth of "Q" is a necessary condition 
for my having the power to refrain from ringing the doorbell. But "Q" is false; 
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I have no such power and, hence, am not free to bring it about that P. 
However, need the proponent of middle knowledge accept (3) and (4)? It 
seems to me not. Consider, for example, the following variations of these prin-
ciples: 
(3') If it is in A's power to bring it about that P and "P" entails "Q" 
and "Q" is false, then it is in A's power to act in such a manner 
that, if she were to act in that fashion, "Q" would be (would always 
have been) true. 
(4') If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q," 
then either it is in A's power to act in such a way that if she were 
to act in that way, "Q" would be (would always have been) true 
or the truth of"Q" is a necessary condition of A's having the power 
to bring it about that P. 
(3') and (4') are identical to (3) and (4) except for the substitution of the phrase 
"then it is in A's power to act in such a manner that, if she were to act in that 
manner "Q" would be (would always have been) true" for the phrase "then it is 
in A's power to bring it about that Q." 
But this substitution is crucial for the concept of middle knowledge. (3) and 
(4) are incompatible with middle knowledge, remember, because they stipulate 
that when "P" entails "Q" and "Q" is false, the agent can only be said to have 
it in her power to bring it about that P if she can bring it about that Q, which 
she in fact cannot do. In other words, (3) and (4) are incompatible with middle 
knowledge because they stipulate in this context that a person can only be said 
to be acting freely if she has it in her power to do the impossible: namely, bring 
it about that a counterfactual of freedom is true. 
But (3') and (4') circumvent this problem. A necessary relationship between 
"Q" and A's action is retained. But (3') and (4') do not require that A have it 
(or even have ever had it) in her power to bring it about that a counterfactual 
("Q") is true before it can be said that she has it in her power to bring it about 
that P. (3') and (4') only require that A have it in her power to do something, 
such that, if she were to do it, the relevant counterfactual of freedom would as 
a matter of fact be (have been) true. For example, to return to our doorbell 
scenario, while (3) and (4) stipulate that if I have it in my power to refrain from 
ringing the doorbell, then I must have it in my power to bring it about that the 
proposition "Q"-if presented with the opportunity to ring the doorbell, I will 
refrain from doing so-is true, (3') and (4') make no such demand. These revised 
principles only require that I have it in my power to refrain from ringing the 
doorbell-i.e., to bring it about that the proposition "P"-I refrain from ringing 
the doorbell-is true. (3') and (4') then simply add that if I were to choose to 
act in this manner, "Q" would be (would always have been) true. And all this, 
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of course, is perfectly compatible with middle knowledge. 
But are (3') and (4') acceptable substitutions for Hasker's (3) and (4)7 Since 
his power entailment principles only differ from mine when "Q" is false, his 
sunrise illustration is clearly unaffected. And his 'simple' doorbell illustration 
also appears to be unaffected. Given (3), we have: 
If I have it in my power to ring your doorbell, and ringing your doorbell 
entails that you now have a doorbell and you don't now have a doorbell, 
then I have it in my power to bring it about that you now have a doorbell. 
Given (3') we have: 
If I have it in my power to ring your doorbell, and ringing your doorbell 
entails that you now have a doorbell and you don't now have a doorbell, 
then I have it in my power to act in such a manner that if I were to act 
in that manner, it would be true that you now have a doorbell. 
Now, of course, (3') is a bit more cumbersome than (3), but they both come to 
the same thing. Either I try something exotic in both cases~.g., 1 claim that 
by petitioning divine intervention, I can bring it about that you now have a 
doorbell, or I admit in both cases that I can't do anything which will instantane-
ously produce a doorbell and thus that I don't have the power to ring the doorbell 
under the stated conditions. 
However, in relation to the 'counterfactual' doorbell example, (3) and (3') 
clearly do not come to the same thing. Given (3), A has the power to bring it 
about that P only if A has the power to bring it about that "Q" is true, while, 
given (3'), A has the power to bring it about that P only if A can bring it about 
that "P" is true (which would then make it the case independently that "Q" is 
true). In short, given (3'), the stipulated condition in question becomes tautolog-
ical-i.e., A has it in her power to bring it about that P only if she has it in her 
power to bring it about that P-while given (3), this is not the case. 
But I do not see how this fact alone counts against (3'). For why should we 
assume that A must meet some other condition~.g., must be able to bring it 
about that "Q" is true-before she has it in her power to bring it about that P. 
It is surely not because our common understanding of what it means for an agent 
to be free with respect to an action leads us to this conclusion. It seems to me 
just the opposite is true: To be free does not appear to require more than that 
we be able to make the relevant choice. The only reason I can see for holding 
that A's ability to bring it about that Q is a necessary condition for her having 
the power to bring it about that P is that (3), and thus (4), requires it. But (3'), 
as we have seen, is every bit as discriminating as (3) when "Q" isn't itself a 
hypothetical conditional of freedom. Thus, I see no reason to pick (3) over (3') 
in relation to hypothetical conditionals unless one already believes that counter-
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factuals of freedom are nonsense or must be made true by the actions of the 
agents involved. And, accordingly, it seems to me that to choose (3) over (3'), 
and thus (4) or (4'), is in the last analysis simply to share one's perspective on 
the middle knowledge debate. But if this is so, then the proponent of middle 
knowledge need not be bothered. She already knows others disagreed with her 
perspective. What she is waiting for is some conclusive argument against her 
position, an argument which I do not think Hasker provides. 
NOTES 
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